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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

HAROLD MICHAEL BROWN,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.
10759

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, Harold Michael Brown, was convicted of the crime of second degree burglary on
jury trial in the Fourth Judicial District, Utah County.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant, bound over to district court, was
charged by information with the crime of burglary
in the second degree. A trial was held on June 14,
1966. The jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged in the information. The Honorable Maurice Harding sentenced the appellant to serve in the Utah
State Prison the indeterminate sentence provided
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by law. From the conviction and judgment the c"'ppellant appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits the conviction should
be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 14, 1966, Mr. Ronald Leroy Call, Jr.
left a residence hall at the Brigham Young University shortly after midnight. Mr. Call, in company with
his brother, Richard Call, was proceeding to his
automobile which was parked on an adjacent parking lot (TR of trial p. 11). The parking area was well
lighted (TR of trial p. 12). While at a distance of 150
feet from his automobile, Ronald Call noticed a person seated in his vehicle (TR of trial p. 12-16). This
person was identified by Ronald Call as the appellant, Harold Michael Brown (TR of trial p. 15-18). Appellant then ran from the Call automobile to an
automobile parked nearby. Ronald Call further testified that the appeallant was carrying certain items
as he ran (TR of trial pp. 12, 13). Ronald Call ran to
the vehicle in which the appellant was then seated,
engaged the appellant briefly in a conversation,
whereupon the appellant handed to Ronald Call
certain items identified by Mr. Call as his property
(TR of trial pp. 13, 14, 15). Mr. Call testified further
that when he returned to his automobile, the glove
compartment had been forced open and also that
certain of the items recovered from the appellant

3
were in the glove compartment shortly prior to his
contact with the appellant (TR of trial pp. 11, 20). The
appellant presented no evidence.
Based on the above evidence, it is submitted
that the conviction should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE
TESTIMONY OF THE COMPLAINING WITNESS.

Appellant contends the complaining witness,
Ronald Call, stated an opinion or conclusion which
over appellant's objection was allowed to stand.
The controversial exchange appears as follows (TR
of trial p. 14):
Mr. Sorensen (District Attorney): Where did

he get those to hand them back to you? (referring to various items of the witnesses' property).
Mr. Van Seiver (Defense Council): I object,
your honor.
The Court: He may answer.
The Witness: Out of my car.
Mr. Sorensen: Well, I mean, when you spoke
to him, did he go back to your car and get
them?
Witness: No, sir. He gave them back to me
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from his car.
The respondent contends the answer of the
witness is not a conclusion, but a statement of his
observations. This same witness had previously testified that the items in question were in his automobile prior to his confrontation of the appellant (TR
of trial pp. 9, 10); that appellant was seated in the
witness's automobile (TR of trial p. 12); that he observed the appellant carry certain objects and tapes
from his car (TR of trial p. 13). It would follow therefore that when this witness testified that the appel·
lant these items from the witness's automobile, it
was not because the witness assumed, concluded or
opined this to have happened, but because this witness, as an eye witness to the commission of a felony, observed it to happen.
The respondent further contends the effect of
the witness's statement, if error at all, was greatly
ameliorated by the subsequent question by Mr.
Sorensen. It should be noted, after the disputed
question was virtuly withdrawn and another question substituted, (T.14) no effort was made by appellant to strike the answer to the original question.
Respondent has no argument with the cases which
hold conclusions and opinions are inadmissible
under certain circumstances, but feels the matter
stated on testimony should be a conclusion or opinion and not an observed fact, in order to apply the
cases cited in appellant's brief to the instant case,
Further, even if the evidence were irrelevant,
incompetent and immaterial it would not furnish a
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ground for reversal where there is abundant competent evidence to establish the fact sought to be
proved by such evidence. Baird v. Denver & R.G.R.
R., 49 Utah 58, 162 Pac. 79 (1916); Utah R. Civ. P., Rule
61.
Clearly the record discloses an abundance of
competent, undisputed evidence as to every element of the crime charged; as a result the trial
court's ruling should be affirmed.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY AS TO THE LAW OF RECENT
POSSESSION.

Appellant urges the necessity of his proposed
instruction on recent possession of stolen property
in the instant case. He argues that without this instruction the jury was entitled to conclude that by
virtue of the possession of certain goods the entry
of the automobile was made (brief of appellant p. 6).
Appellant overlooks the instructions charged in the
instant case. The jury was instructed to dutifully
follow the law as stated by the court (R-21); and that
the following must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.
(1) The unlawful, felonious entry of Ronald
Call's automobile by the defendant, (2) The specific intent to steal from the victim at the time of entry,
(3) That the entry occured during the nighttime, on
on or about a specific date (R-25).
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These two instructions, when considered together, preclude any such fanciful notion as advanced by appellant regarding the entitlement of the
jury to conclude entry from recent possession of
certain property. The jury was charged to find specific entry and nothing else would suffice under the
instructions.
It was totally unnecessary for the trial court to
inject, on appellant's urging, any theory regarding
the consideration of recent possession of stolen property in order to "presume" the appellant's guilt:
The entire prosecution in the instant matter was predicated upon the testimony of an eye witness who
apprehended the appellant at the scene of the crime
(R-13). What necessity compels the trial court to instruct the jury that they must find that the possession
was sufficiently recent to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis than burglary, as submitted by
appellant in his proposed instruction (R-18)?
In 23A C.

J. S. Criminal Law§ 1310 it is stated:

The instructions should be predicated on, and applicable to, the issues presented by the pleadings and the
evidence, and should be concrete as to each issuable,
and should be concrete as to each issuable fact, not
abstract; an instruction which although it states a
correct legal proposition, is not based on, or applicable to, the issues raised by the pleadings and the
evidence, or which is abstract is erroneous and properly refused.

Accord: State v. Bebee, 110 Utah 484, 174 P.2d 478
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(1946); State v. Thompson, 110 Utah 113, 170 P.2d
153 (1946); State v. Anderson, 100 Utah 468, 116 P.2d
398 0941); State v. Chealey, 100 Utah 423, 116 P.2d
377 (1941); State v. Dubois, 98 Utah 234, 98 P.2d 354
(1940); State v. Marasco, 81 Utah 325, 17 P.2d 919
(1933).
Further, respondent contends the refusal of trial
court to grant appellant's proposed instruction was
not non-prejudicial but favorable to the appellant.
Under the instructions given by the court it was
necessary to establish all the elements of burglary
without the benefit or use of inference or presumption; whereas if the court had granted the proposed
instruction the burden on the state was appreciably
less, in that an unlawful entry could be inferred by
possession of stolen property when coupled with
other facts and circumstances. The error, if such it
was, in refusing the instruction was clearly not prejudicial. The appellant received the instructions he
was entitled to on the law applicable to the evidence.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO GRANT PROBATION OF
THE APPELLANT.

This court in State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 310
P.2d 388 (1957) observed:
Probation is not a matter of right, and this is so no
matter how unsullied a reputation one convicted of
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crime may be able to demonstrate to the trial judge
the granting or withholding of probation involver:
considerable intangibles of character, personality and
attitude, of which the cold record gives little inkling.
These matters, which are to be considered in connection with the prior record of the accused, are of
such nature that the problem of probation must oi
necessity rest within the discretion of the Judge who
hears the case.

An extensive hearing was held before the trial
court on July 29, 1966, concerning a further stay of
execution on the judgment of committment pronounced against appellant on July 15, 1966. At the
hearing it was determined the appellant had a prior
criminal record (TR of hearing p. 12); that appellant
was awaiting action on a criminal charge originating in Salt Lake County (TR of hearing p. 13); and
further, that appellant had given inconsistent explanations to police authorities and probation offi·
cials regarding the origin of certain items in the poss·
ession of appellant at the time of his apprehension
(TR of hearing pp. 14, 15). Respondent therefore sub·
mits that the record clearly discloses a sufficient and
substantial basis to sustain the action of the trial
court in refusing probation.
It is urged that the trial court improperly con·
sidered appellant's possession of certain items which
were seized in violation of appellant's constitutional·
ly protected rights. In support of this position appel·
lant incorporates in his brief an unidentified minute
entry (brief of appellant p. 9) which is not part of the
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record and therefore not entitled to consideration
on appeal [Brandley v. Lewis. 97 Utah 217, 92 P.2d
338 (1939)J.
The question of the constitutionally prohibited
search and seizure was not before the trial court during the hearing, and the absence of evidence on the
matter was even brought to appellant's attention
(TR of hearing p. 17). It appears, therefore, the question is being presented initially on appeal and should
not be considered by this court [State v. Starlight
Club. 17 Utah 2d 174, 406 P.2d 912 (1965); State v.
Hammond. 64 Wash. 2d 591, 392 P.2d 1010 (1964)J.
A further contention is urged by appellant in
that the trial court required appellant to testify
against himself, by admitting guilt, or face a denial
of probation. The precise issue was raised and argued in the Sibert case (supra) where the court
stated:
It is contended that the effect of such reasoning is
to force defendant to either testify against himself
or have probation denied, which would violate the
constitutional protections against self incrimination.
(United States Constitution Amend V; Utah Constitution art I, § 12). He has no refuge in such provisions after he has been convicted of the crime in question.

Respondent submits, therefore, the position of appellant lacks support in both law and logic.

CONCLUSION
An examination of the record refutes appellant's
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assertions that error arose from admission of testimony stating a conclusion. The trial court properly
refused to instruct the jury on the law of recent possession as the issue was not raised in the evidence.
Further, the trial court, soundly and fairly exercised
its discretion in denying probation of the appellant.
The appeal is without merit and the conviction
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
GERALD G. GUNDRY
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

